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  Abstract 
  For a sample of 34 countries, this paper examines the impact that relational goods have 
on trust and, more specifically, trustworthiness; that is the degree of trust placed in others. 
Relational goods emanate from social interactions, which can be viewed as underpinning the 
development of social capital in the sense of helping to form trust in society. The relational goods 
examined comprise both informal activities such as meeting with family and friends, as well as 
more formal but voluntary association connected with participation in cultural, political, civic, 
sport and religious organisations. As the measure of trust comprises an ordered variable, a variety 
of ordered estimators are applied to the data, including attempts to account for the country-
specific grouping of observation and, as a consequence, unobserved heterogeneity. The results 
suggest that whilst informal relational activities tend to generate trustworthiness, consistent with 
the concept of ‘thick’ trust, along with cultural and civic association and frequent political 
association, there is less evidence that sports does. In addition, the results suggest that religious 
association can actually reduce trustworthiness along with less frequent political association. 
Therefore, the results suggest, that it is the type and frequency of associational activity that 
contributes to the development of trustworthiness, rather than its existence per se. 
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1.  Introduction 
There is a growing economic literature analysing trust in society. Seminal contributions 
argue that trust can help to facilitate a more efficient exchange of resources because of, 
for example, the presence of incomplete contracts (Arrow, 1972). More recently, it has 
been  argued  that  trust  can  promote  economic  growth  because  it  represents  the 
formation of social capital through social interactions and associative behaviour (Ben-
Ner and Halldorsson, 2010; Kugler et al, 2007; Glaeser et al, 2000, Knack and Keefer, 
1997, Fukuyama, 1995). However, there is a developing debate about this possibility. 
Initially,  Olson  (1982)  identified  negative  consequences  from  associational  activity 
deriving  from  agents’  identifying  with  particular  groups  with  the  likely  consequent 
promotion  of  special  interests.  This  can  limit  benefits  to  wider  society  and  the 
promotion of growth, because of lobbying for preferential policies.1 In contrast, Putnam 
(1993) argues that associational activity can  promote growth  because it encourages 
cooperation, solidarity and public spiritedness.  More recently, Roth (2009) has argued 
that the presence of these potentially opposite impacts could be rooted in the initial 
levels of trust held by societies.  Activities that promote trust from initial positions of 
low trust, will promote economic growth, but not if the init ial levels of trust in society 
are high. 
  
In this paper, rather than assessing the impacts of trust,   the emphasis  is upon the 
production of trust from associational activity. C ross-country evidence is presented to 
explore the  factors  affecting  trust  and,  in particular, trustworthiness, which is the 
degree of trust placed in others. The particular contribution of the paper is to examine 
how,  using  micro  data  of  individual  activity  across  countries,  different  forms  of 
association, and the frequency with which it takes place,  affects trustworthiness.2 Both 
informal activities such as meeting with family and friends, as well as more  voluntary 
                                                 
1 Earlier contibutions such as James (1904) and Loury (1977) identified social capital with the ability of an 
individual to do well in social situations. The literature referred to subsequently in this paper, conceptualises 
social capital as a group-level, not individual-level entity.   
2 At this point it should be emphasised that the causal claims made in this paper are weak because of its cross-
sectional emphasis, and it focuses on types of associational activity across countries. Unlike papers taking a 
country level and aggregate perspective of the relationships between trust, economic growth and other social 
institutions, suitable panel data do not exist for exploring individual participation in associational activity across 
countries (Roth, 2009; Bergh and Bjønrnskov, 2010).   4 
 
association connected with participation in, cultural, political, civic, sports and religious 
organisations are investigated.3 As discussed below, the previous literature has tended 
to focus on the formal, legal and institutional bases of trust, or assumed a priori which 
types of association have particular affects on trust. The results of this paper suggest 
that whilst informal relational activities tend to generate trustworthiness, along with 
cultural and civic association and frequent political association, there is less evidence 
that  association  through  sports  does.  In  addition,  the  results  suggest  that  religious 
association  can  actually  reduce  trustworthiness  along  with  less  frequent  political 
association. This suggests strongly that it is the type of associational activity and aspects 
of its frequency that contributes to the development of trustworthiness and hence social 
capital,  rather  than  its  existence  per  se.    Policy  proclamations  about  the  efficacy  of 
voluntary  activity  in  producing  social  cohesion,  thus  need  to  be  grounded  in  more 
detailed and targeted understanding of such impacts.4  
 
To  address  these  issues,  t he  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  2  examines  the 
definitions  and  measurement  of  trust  in  economics ,  and  hence  why  this  paper 
investigates  trustworthiness  as  a  dimension  of  this ,  how  the  economic  literature 
examines social interactions and associati ve behaviour,  and then the formation of 
different types of social capital. Section 3 presents the data used in the analysis, and 
Section 4 the empirical methods employed. Because of the ordered nature of the 
measurement  of  trustworthiness,  and  that  internation al  cross-section  data  are 
examined,  a  variety  of  ordered  estimators  are  applied to  the  data.  These  include 
attempts  to  account  for  the  country -specific  grouping  of  observation s  and,  as  a 
consequence, unobserved heterogeneity. Results are presented and discussed in Section 
5 and conclusions then follow in Section 6.  
 
2.  Literature Review 
There are two main ways in which trust has been investigated in economics.  The first 
follows Berg et al’s (1995) experimental approach, which has used primary data to test 
                                                 
3 As discussed further below, different dimensions of trust may be associated with these activities.  
4 This suggests that, for example, rather general policy pronouncements such as the current UK coalition 
government’s advocacy of a ‘Big Society’ based upon localised voluntary action raising social welfare need to 
be refined and grounded in much more detailed analysis of the evidence  5 
 
the predictions of the ‘trust game’ (see, for example, Kugler, et al 2007 for an extension 
of the analysis from individuals to groups). The second has been to examine secondary 
data for an empirical assessment of either how trust affects economic growth, or other 
macroeconomic  performance  indicators,  or  to  explore  the  factors  which  affect  
statements about trust in large-scale surveys.  The current research draws upon both of 
these elements of the literature. Whilst, the second research approach is the one utilised 
in  this  paper,  as  it  explores  the  determination  of  trust,  ,  the  literature  in  the  first 
approach illustrates the theory of trust, and how it is formed,  and which is needed to 
interpret empirical  results. Consequently, it is this analysis of trust that is reviewed 
first. 
 
In  the  trust  game  an  individual  ‘A’  sends  another  individual  ‘B’  a  hypothetical 
proportion of an assumed endowment. ‘B’ is informed that they receive a multiple of 
this amount and they are also informed that they can return to ‘A’ any amount, less than 
or equal to the amount that they received. ‘A’ thus receives the initial endowment plus 
the net receipts from the transfers to and from ‘B’.  In this game it is argued that the 
amount that ‘A’ transfers to ‘B’ is a measure of trusting behaviour. How much ‘A’ is 
prepared to trust ‘B’.  In contrast the amount returned from ‘B’ to ‘A’ is a measure of the 
trustworthiness of ‘B’, that is, can ‘B’ actually be trusted by ‘A’.  In game theoretic terms 
this  presents  trust  as  a  voluntary  transfer  to  someone,  with  expected  but  not 
guaranteed  reciprocity.  One  might  expect  that  a  one-shot  game  would  reveal    no 
trustworthiness and reciprocity as there are no reputational effects, that is costs to ‘B’ in 
capturing  the  transfer  in  full.  Despite  this,  it  has  been  shown  experimentally  that 
trustworthiness is common and this has been linked to the formation of social capital 
(Chaudhuri et al, 2002).   
 
Such results are not necessarily criticism of the game-theoretic perspective. As argued 
by Gunnthorsdottir et al (2002), ‘other-regarding’ acts can be viewed as investments in 
reputation per se.  Investing trust in others produces a trustworthy return. It seems 
likely  that  the  experimental  results  reveal  that  in  practice,  with  social  interactions, 
agents retain the view that there is always the possibility that they may meet the other 
agent with whom they are trading again. It can also be argued that the reputational 
effects  from  reciprocity  have  externalities  that  spill  over  to  other  activities  and 6 
 
interactions with other agents as well. It has long been recognised in economics that 
individuals can invest not only in human  capital, but also reputation  through social 
interactions. For example, Manski (2000) argues that the mechanisms by which social 
interactions  can  occur  have  long  been  explored  in  economics.  The  most  traditional 
formats have been through either the preferences of agents being directly affected by 
the consumption of others (Veblen, 1934; Duesenberry, 1949; Liebenstein, 1950) or 
through the expectations of agents stemming from rational and adaptive mechanisms 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Tverskey and Kahneman, 1974 and Lucas, 1976).  
 
In the former case, with externalities providing the mechanism by which interactions 
occur,  the  theoretical  foundations  were  more  formally  developed  in  Becker  (1974). 
Here it is recognised that agents can invest in social characteristics as part of their social 
environment, which is part of the wealth of individuals.  Important features of Becker’s 
analysis are that the economic agent is a consumer-producer of the goods and services 
yielding utility, and that all externalities stemming from the benefits of accruing social 
characteristics are effectively internalised. Cauley and Sandler (1980) generalised the 
analysis to one in which the consumption of other agents affects the ability of agents to 
produce the goods that they ultimately consume. This implies that the Coase Theorem 
does not have to hold, that is that agents take full account of their interactions with 
others, which is implied in Becker (1974). In contrast, a series of possibilities exist in 
which  the  Coase  Theorem  result,  or  no  account  being  taken  by  individuals  of 
interactions,  are  special  cases.  In  general,  the  outcomes  depend  on  the  extent  of 
bargaining between agents and their awareness of spillovers.  
 
It seems clear that club-goods, in which voluntary groups derive benefit from sharing 
production costs, the members’ characteristics, or a good characterised by excludable 
benefits, can be seen as naturally building upon such interactions (Cornes and Sandler, 
1986). Likewise, one might view such activity as producing relational goods – that is 
associated with the non-instrumental and experiential dimensions of the activities of 
economic agents (Gui, 2000). This is because relational goods might be expected to be 
linked  most  closely  to  associations  of  both  a  formal  and  informal  nature.  However, 
expressed it can be seen that club goods or relational goods are inherently produced 7 
 
from  social  interactions  and  as  such  capture  elements  of  reciprocity  and 
trustworthiness (Chaudhuri et al 2002).  
 
That trust – and its dimensions - underpin social capital is made clearer in considering 
the  origins  of  the  concept  of  social  capital  from  Fukuyama  (1995),  Bordieu  (1997), 
Coleman  (1994)  and  Putnam  (1993,  2000).  Fukuyama  (1995)  argues  that  trust  is 
literally  the  manifestation  of  social  capital  and  this  facilitates  the  efficiency  of 
organisations. For example, in situations of low-trust, relationships tend to be limited to 
the restricted family or ethnic group. Horizontal organizations, such as guilds, unions, 
and clubs are formed less easily and strong hierarchies tend to emerge. Consequently, it 
is  argued  that  hierarchical  religions,  like  the  Catholic  Church,  have  historically 
hampered spontaneous economic sociability and integration.  
 
For  Bordieu  (1997)  social  capital  is  linked  to  the  building  of  durable  networks  of 
relationships for elites for their mutual advantage. In this regard social capital is linked 
directly  to  the  accumulation  of  economic  and  cultural  capital,  that  is  the  economic, 
knowledge and skill resources possessed by individuals respectively. Coleman (1994) 
by contrast does not view social capital as something that helps to reproduce an elite 
but, rather, the family and community relationships and organisation that affect the 
ability  of  individuals  to  develop  their  human  capital.  Resonating  with  Bourdieu’s 
cultural capital, this is identified with the education, employment skills and expertise 
possessed by individuals.  
 
The  economic  literature  has  tended  to  emphasise  the  foundational  contribution  of 
Putnam (1993, 2000) and Fukuyama (1995). The former conceptualises social capital as 
the property of aggregate structures, such as communities, cities or regions, which are 
held together by networks.  Of direct relevance for this paper is that like Fukuyama 
(1995), Putnam (1993, 2000) emphasises how trust, developed through social capital, 
helps to make communities and societies more efficient by reducing the need for formal 
forms of transaction such as contracts, or formal exchange of ideas, information and 
resources,  but  at  the  same  time  enables  the  collective  pursuit  of  objectives.  In  this 
respect,  Putnam  also  places  more  emphasis  on  organised  social  groups  than,  say 
Bordieu  (1997)  or  Coleman  (1994).  Further,  it  is  maintained  that  varieties  of 8 
 
organisations  may  affect  social  capital  differently  and  that  a  distinction  between 
bonding  and  bridging  capital  should  be  made.  The  former  promotes  homogeneity 
between those of similar characteristics and familiarity. In contrast, bridging capital 
links  heterogeneous  groups  and  individuals.  This  echoes  Fukuyama’s  distinction 
between  horizontal  and  vertical  association.  What  is  distinct  about  Putnam  (1993, 
2000) is that it is recognised that there can be tension between the impacts of these 
forms of social capital formation. For example, Putnam (2000) argues that a decline in 
social capital can be charted by examining the decline in organised US league bowling, 
and the growth of commercial recreational bowling and organisation. The decline in 
social capital is as a result of both the reduction of the regularity and sustained meeting 
of  acquaintances,  but  also  through  that  associated  with  acquaintances  of  a  diverse 
character.  In this respect it might be expected that associations that reinforce similarity 
may raise bonding social capital and trust, but may reduce bridging capital and trust. It 
is,  of  course,  the  latter  characteristic  of  voluntary  associations  that  is  implicitly 
emphasised by Olson (1982).   
 
Collectively  such  seminal  literature  suggests  that  different  types  of  association  may 
affect social capital and trust differently. It is in this respect that this paper examines the 
impact of both informal activities such as meeting with family and friends, as well as 
more formal association connected with participation in cultural, political, civic, sports 
and religious organisations. To borrow Putnam’s terminology the literature suggests 
that if views of the trustworthiness of others reduce through associative activity then 
division is encouraged and, at best, bonding capital might dominate bridging capital. In 
contrast,  if  views  of  the  trustworthiness  of  others  increases  through  associative 
activities then they are promoting bridging capital and, also bonding capital.  
 
As  discussed  earlier,  as  well  as  the  game  theoretic  analysis  of  trust,  an  empirical 
literature has developed analysing trust as measured on surveys such as the General 
Social  Survey,  or  the  World  Values  Survey  through  an  ordered  scale.  On  the  scale 
respondents indicate whether or not they can trust other people or indicate degrees by 
which ‘they can’t be too careful in dealing with them’.  This is also the case in the current 
research as discussed in Section 3.  The main direction of the literature, as noted in the 9 
 
introduction, has been to examine the impacts of trust on economic performance, with 
some literature examining the determinants of trust.  
 
For  example,  trust  has  been  shown  to  provide  a  positive  impact  on  government 
effectiveness,  civic  and  organisational  performance  and  social  efficiency,  linked  to 
issues such as infrastructure quality, high school completions and infant mortality, by 
La Porta et al (1997), for a sample of 40 countries. Helliwell and Putnam (1995) show 
that  more  developed  civic  communities  in  Italian  regions  had  higher  growth  rates, 
whilst Knack and Keefer (1997) show that both trust and civic cooperation had large 
effects on growth for a sample of 29 countries. Temple and Johnson (1998) identify that 
trust has a positive effect on the growth of a sample of 74 developing countries. Finally, 
Zak and Knack (2001) analyse a sample of 41 countries for a series of cross sections for 
1981 - 1984, 1990 - 1993 and 1995 - 1997 (of the World values Survey) and identify 
that trust is positively associated with growth and investment.  
 
Significantly,  Knack  and  Keefer  (1997)  and  Temple  and  Johnson  (1998)  distinguish 
between associations that might help to develop bonding rather than bridging social 
capital, as argued by Olson (1982), and those that might also bridge different groups as 
argued by Putnam (1993).  A priori, it is argued that associations which may reduce 
trust - Olson-type associations – include trade unions, political parties and professional 
organisations. In contrast it is argued that Putnam-type associations, which may raise 
trust, include youth, religious and education, arts and cultural associations. The papers 
find support for the differential effects on growth that these forms of association entail.5 
The differential impact of  trust on growth has been more recently addressed by Roth 
(2009), as indicated in the introduction . Also examining 41 countries over a series of 
waves of  the  World  Values Survey and Eurobarometer data,  it is identified that for 
countries starting with low initial levels of trust, increases  in trust  add to economic 
growth. This is not the case for countries with high initial levels of trust. Other research, 
such as Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011) show that for a  cross-section sample of countries 
                                                 
5 Temple and Johnson (1998) also find strong impacts of a multidimensional social development index on 
economic growth. Olson-type groups have no significant impact on growth for Knack and Keefer (1997), rather 
than a negative effect. 10 
 
in 2008, it is levels of trust that can be associated with the provision of a larger welfare 
state. This is explained by trust helping to overcome free-rider problems. 
 
As  part  of  this  literature,  some  attempt  has  also  been  made  to  measure  the 
determinants of trust. Further to exploring the impact of trust on economic growth, 
Knack and Keefer (1997) identify that Olson-type associations reduce trust, whereas 
Putnam-type  associations  raise  trust.  Likewise,  Zak  and  Knack  (2001)  identify  that 
property  rights,  contract  enforceability,  corruption  perceptions,  investor  rights,  as 
measures of formal institutions; together with Gini coefficient measurements of income 
and  land  ownership  inequalities,  and  ethnic  homogeneity,  as  measures  of  ‘social 
distance’ in the population, are significant determinants of trust. The emphasis in this 
research was more on formal institutional determinants of trust as indicated by Putnam 
(2000) and Newton (1997).   
 
The  fact  that  different  analyses  of  trust  draw  upon  different  forms  of  interaction 
between  agents raises the  important  question  of what  is  actually  measured in such 
surveys. The literature distinguishes between the ‘thick’ trust that is associated with 
family networks. It is argued that other interpersonal relationships, or generalised trust, 
are generated by looser secondary social relations. Finally it is argued that systemic or 
institutional trust is captured in legal arrangements (Roth, 2009). Clearly dimensions of 
each of these aspects of trust might be captured in a survey question, and consequently 
indicated  by  significant  statistical  relationships  between  trust  and  some  specific 
measures of the factors that are theorised to determine it.  
 
Yet more fundamental issues are at stake in considering what is captured by questions 
about  trust,  once  one  recognises  from  the  trust  game  that  two  aspects  of  trust  are 
evident in reciprocity. In a comprehensive study of survey measurements, Glaeser et al 
(2000) argue that trustworthiness, rather than trusting, as defined earlier, is captured 
by typical survey questions and it is upon this strict basis that such questions measure 
an  ingredient of social capital  as a  meaningful individual-level  variable. Futher, it is 
argued  that  this  dimension  of  trust,  essentially  experienced  through  interactions,  is 
distinct from deeper elements of trust and trustworthiness which, as argued by Uslaner 
(2002, 2008a,b) have a moralistic foundation. Such moralistic trust would be developed, 11 
 
for  example,  through  childhood  socialisation,  and  consequently  exist  relatively 
independently  of  specific  social  interactions  and  remain  relatively  stable  over  the 
lifetime.6  
 
From an empirical perspective this means that one might expect  to observe different 
levels of trust  persisting  between  agents, despite  their individual  trust  per  se  being 
moderated by experiences through interactions. Reflecting such an idea, much of the 
literature, argues that different nationalities might exhibit persistent higher levels of 
trust,  such  as  is  observed  in  the  Scandinavian  countries,  or  ethnic  groups  within 
countries (Bergh and Bjønrnskov, 2010). Another important feature of Uslaner’s work is 
that  it  argues  that  (moralistic)  trust  involves  more  than  just  belonging  to  a  civic, 
religious or educational group but the undertaking of good deeds such as charitable 
giving and volunteering when engaging with people who are different. There are strong 
echoes with the concept that trust requires investment in bridging social capital, as with 
Putnam.  Drawing  upon  this  literature,  therefore,  this  paper  seeks  to  analyse  the 
determinants of trustworthiness, as generated by family networks and forms of more 
informal  and  non-contractual  association,  and  their  consequent  formation  of  social 
capital, for a cross-section of countries according to the frequency of association.   
 
3.  Data  
The data employed in this analysis draw on the International Social Survey Programme 
(ISSP), which is a collaborative survey programme that currently comprises 46 member 
countries. Data are collected on a variety of social, economic and environmental themes. 
Data from 2007 are employed because in this year sports and leisure activities were 
investigated through a Leisure Time and Sports module. As sports often comprise the 
greatest level of voluntary and associative behaviour, this provided the best opportunity 
to assess the widest possible range of associative activities (Downward et al, 2009).  In 
the current research, therefore, a sample size of 49,730 is obtained from 34 of the 36 
participant countries.7  
 
                                                 
6 An important feature of Uslaner’s work is that it argues that (moralistic) trust involves more than just 
belonging to a civic group, but good deeds such as charitable giving and volunteering. 
7 At the time of writing data from Denmark and the Netherlands was not available. 12 
 
In this data, the variable describing generalized trust in society – which as discussed 
above essentially measures trustworthiness - is employed as a dependent variable for 
social  capital.  The  variable  is  measured  on  a  4-point  scale  (1=people  can  always  be 
trusted  to  4=people  cannot  be  trusted  at  all).8  It  is  assumed,  that  interpersonal 
differences in this variable might be explained due to differences in  the engagement in 
relational activities, such as various groups and associations. Consequently, a series of 
covariates measure participation in  cultural, civic, church, sport and political groups 
and associations,  to explore the affects of  these activities  on  the creation of social 
capital.  Getting together with relatives and friends  are  also included as  explanatory 
variables  because of the obvious pleasure that might be enjoyed  while undertaking 
these more informal relational activities, and as discussed above, it is identified that 
they are an important feature of trusting relationships. As with the dependent variables 
these covariates are measured on ordinal scales, so  getting together with family and 
friends, are recoded into four dummies each indicating (1=daily, 2=several times a week, 
3=several times a month, 4=several times a year) the corresponding engagement in these 
activities.  Participation  in  cultural,  civic,  political,  sport  and  church  groups  or 
associations  is  recoded as  four dummies  but  with different meanings, reflecting the 
different periodicity that is measured (1=at least once a week, 2= at least once a month, 
3=several times a year, 4=once or twice a year).  
 
To  control  for  other  variations  in  both  life  experiences  as  well  as  economic 
circumstances,  socio-demographic  characteristics  of  individuals  are  also  included  as 
explanatory variables. These include age in years, age2, gender (sex: 1=male, 0 = female), 
household size (hsize), years of education (eduyear), marital status (couple, divorced, 
separated, widowed, reference category: single), income, as well as employment status 
(full time employment: ftemp, part time employment: ptemp, retired, housewife or man: 
keephouse,  unemployed,  reference  category-  other  employment:  otheremp  ).  Variable 
definitions and descriptive statistics are given in Table 1.  
 
The treatment of income in the current research required some manipulation because 
the  data  on  income  referred  to  either  months  or  annual  values.  Further,  different 
                                                 
8 The order of the dependent variable has been reversed in our analysis in order to make the intepretation of the 
regression results more intuitive, where a higher number indicates higher trust. 13 
 
countries  either  collected  income  data  gross  of  tax  or  net  of  tax.  To  cope  with  this 
complexity two strategies were adopted. In one case all country-specific incomes were 
transformed into a net annual US dollar purchasing power equivalent income estimates. 
This involved three sets of calculations.  The first entailed dividing all income estimates 
by the country-specific purchasing power parity exchange rate (PPP), which is given 
with local currency units per international dollar and obtained from the United Nations' 
webpage.  In  a  second  step,  monthly  income  was  multiplied  by  12  to  obtain  annual 
income  for  all  countries  but  Australia,  Great  Britain,  Ireland,  Japan,  Norway,  New 
Zealand, Slovakia and the United States of America in which annual income was already 
presented. Finally, for some countries the income estimates had to be transformed from 
gross  into  net  values.  Using  data  from  national  statistics  offices’  home  pages,  and 
identifying the gross domestic product (GDP) as gross income in an economy, a tax rate 
‘t’ was calculated as the ratio of a countries' annual income tax revenues to their GDP. 
Net incomes were generated by multiplying gross incomes from the actual data by a 
factor calculated as ’1’ minus the implied tax rate, ‘t’.  This generated a net annual US 
dollar purchasing power equivalent income estimate 
 
To  check  the  robustness  of  this  transformation,  a  second  strategy  involved  using 
standardized measures of each country’s income series to remove differences in the 
levels and variances of the differently recorded incomes. As this produced incomes that 
could  vary  across  zero,  a  dummy  variable  was  also  constructed  to  be  scored  ‘1’ 
whenever  ‘negative’  income  was  recorded  and  was  also  included  in  the  regression 
analysis with the standardized income measures to check for the sign of effects. The 
standardised measures produced extremely similar results and thus are omitted for 
economy of presentation.9      
 
4.  Estimators 
To account for the fact that the trust variable is an ordinal variable, ordered estimators 
were employed. Following Greene and Hensher (2010), the ordered probit model can 
be understood as based upon the random utility model which, for individual i is: 
                                                 
9 In all of the results which follow only the former income measure is presented. The standardised 
measures produced extremely similar results and thus are omitted for economy of presentation. They are 
available on request.  14 
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* N i x y i i i                                                  (1) 
 
In this equation the dependent variable represents the underlying random utility, or 
latent variable, in which continuous latent u tility  yi*  is  observed  in  discrete  form 
through the censoring mechanism: 
 
0 i y   if  , 0
*
1 i y  
     = 1  if  , 1
*
0 i y  
     = 2  if  , 2
*
1 i y  
                                                             = … 
  = J  if  .
*
1 J i J y                                                         (2) 
 
The vector xi is a set of K covariates that are assumed to be strictly independent of εi; β 
is a vector of K parameters. The thresholds divide the range of utility into cells that are 
then identified with the observed ratings of trust.  
 
The  existing  literature  applying  ordered  choice  models  has  tended  to  concentrate 
empirical discussion upon estimated coefficients.10 The absolute values of the estimated 
parameters, however, do not have much explanatory value on their own due to scale 
differences. The effect of a change in one of the variables in the model depends on all the 
model parameters, the data, and which probability (cell) is of interest. Therefore, one 
possibility is to compute partial effects to give the impact on the specific probabilities 
associated  with  each  category  of  the  dependent  variable  per  unit  change  in  the 
covariate. The partial effects in the ordered choice model are expressed as 
 







i                    (3) 
 
When the utility function is linear in parameters, it might be regarded that a positive 
(negative) coefficient is connected with a reduction (increa se) in the probability in the 
                                                 
10 In much of the literature discussed above versions of linear models tend to be used. 15 
 
lowest  cell  and  an  increase  (reduction)  in  the  probability  in  the  highest  cell  of  the 
dependent  variable.  With  the  single  crossing  feature  of  the  model,  such  that  some 
probabilities fall and some rise as the value of a covariate changes, one can imply that 
probabilities have shifted in a particular direction. Therefore, the sign of the partial 
effect of the highest cell of the ordered dependent variable will coincide with that of the 
covariate indicating the direction of the effect (Greene and Hensher, 2010).  
 
Because of the possibility that the distribution of trust may vary across countries, as for 
example  driven  by  moralistic  trust,  because  of  national  preferences  or  cultural 
relativities  and,  indeed  simply  because  of  sampling  across  different  countries,  three 
further specifications were estimated than simply the ordered choice model (see, for 
example, Wooldridge, 2009). Both random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) ordered 
models were used to control for the country of observation being a grouping variable.11 
The final specification involved estimating the ordered model allowing for clustering of 
the standard errors within countries.  This adjusts the variances because of correlation 
between the observations in a cluster, re flecting the sampling strategy, and producing 
latent heterogeneity (Greene, 2008).  
 
5.  Results 
Results from all of the regressions are presented in Table 2. The broad columns of the 
table present results for the basic ordered model, the random effects model, the fixed 
effects model, and the ordered model with clustered standard errors respectively. In 
each of these columns three sets of data are presented: coefficient estimates, t-statistics, 
used to assess their significance, and the partial effects as discussed above. Significance 
is indicated for each coeffcient as ***, ** or * for  the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels respectively. 
The partial effects presented are for the highest value of the trust variable for each 
covariate. Because of missing values across the covariates the sample size on which 
estimation takes place is 31,825 observations. The missing values also mean that the 
                                                 
11 In general fixed effects are to be preferred over random effects. In the random effects context the impact of 
the country effects can be established with reference to a rho (ρ) statistic ρ = σc
2/σc
2+σic
2 where c is a country 
specific variance and ic a random variance across individuals and countries. ρ>0 suggests correlations of errors 
of individuals in any country. Because of the likely endogeneity between country effects and the covariates FE 
models are generally preferred (Wooldridge, 2009)  16 
 
countries  Russia,  Sweden,  Hungary,  Slovenia  and  GB  have  to  be  omitted  from  the 
analysis.  
The results presented in Table 2 show that for the socio-economic covariates there is 
some variance in the effects for age and age squared and being divorced. The ordered 
model and its version with clustered errors suggest significant quadratic and negative 
effects  for  these  variables  respectively,  but  this  is  not  the  case  for  either  panel 
estimator. This suggests that the relationships between ageing and trust, and perhaps 
feelings of vulnerability from being divorced leading to reduced feelings of trust are 
country-specific.  Clearly different countries might provide different support systems to 
cope with the impact of ageing and separation.  
 
In contrast, positive robust impacts of years of education, being in education and levels 
of  income  on  trust  are  identified  across  all  specifications.  Further,  negative  robust 
impacts  on  trust  of household size  and being bereaved are identified. These  results 
suggest, respectively, that education and income, as generally indicative of human and 
economic  capital,  also  produce,  as  indicated  in  the  literature  review,  social  capital. 
However, it might be the case that having children or dependents in the household, 
which increases its size, generates a more general sense of vulnerability or lack of trust 
in others, as does the loss of a partner.  
  
Some  support  for  these  latter  comments  are  suggested  in  considering  the  informal 
relational goods of associating with family and friends. These generate broadly robust 
and positive effects on trust with the highest marginal effects being observed for more 
regular associations. This is despite insignificant results for daily contact with either for 
the  fixed  effects  specification,  and  daily  association  with  relatives  according  to  the 
random  effects  specification.  On  balance  these  results  suggest  strong  evidence  that 
informal associations raise social capital through trust as argued in the literature.  
 
In  contrast,  some  variation  in  results  is,  identified  for  more  formal  associations 
connected with cultural, church, civic, sport and political groups, though once again a 
broad finding is that more frequent association has the largest effect for any given type 
of  association.  Taking  the  ordered  and  clustered  ordered  models  first,  generally 
significant  and  positive  effects  are  identified  for  all  periodicities  of  association  and 17 
 
across all types of association with the exception of politics and associations via the 
church. In the former case the most frequent political association, probably reflecting 
strong political attachment perhaps associated with being an activist, generates trust. In 
contrast,  less  frequent  association  with  a  political  group  is  associated  with  reduced 
trust.  It  is  probably  the  case  that  such  associations  are  connected  more  with 
protestation about a specific issue and hence discontent.  These results are also broadly 
shared with the panel data estimates, though the likely protest effect only shares the 
sign and the not statistical significance. Such results indicate that the earlier literature 
that identifies the creation or not of social capital with the type of association per se is 
subject to qualification. In the case of the church, generally negative impacts on social 
capital are identified. Initially this seems to be counter intuitive until one recognises 
that strongly identified faith groups are likely to reinforce bonding rather than bridging 
capital. The same qualitative results, if not general levels of significance for periodicities 
of  association,  are  identified  for  the  panel  estimators  for  all  but  the  most  frequent 
associations through churches. A significant and positive sign for the random effects 
estimator and an insignificant but positive sign for the fixed effects estimator give the 
suggestions that allowing for variations across countries regular church going may also 
be connected with bridging social capital. There is intuition in these results in that more 
frequent  church  association  is  likely  to  be  connected  with  ‘devout’  behaviour,  as 
opposed to some form of instrumental connection with a church association., It may, 
therefore, be expected to be connected with a sentiment of seeking harmony across 
communities. Such results are consistent with Anderson  et al (2010) who find little 
general  support  for  the  view  that  religious  people  exhibit  greater  ‘other  regarding’ 
sentiment.  These  results  indicate  that  the  intuition  that  politics  and  religion  are 
potentially forces for both social cohesion and division has some support.   
 
Standing in direct contrast to these results is associative behaviour connected with civic 
and  cultural  activities.  These  have  ubiquitously  positive  effects  on  trust.  The  only 
difference between the estimates is that the fixed effects results have some insignificant 
effects  for  some  periodicities.  Broadly  this  positive  effects  is  not  surprising  as  such 
activities are almost inherently connected with ‘tastes’ and the enhancement of society. 
There would almost by definition be less scope in such activities to create division in 
society and mistrust.  18 
 
 
The final set of results to discuss concern sport. For the ordered and clustered ordered 
models there is consistent evidence that engagement in sports associations raises trust. 
However, these results all but disappear for the panel estimators except for the most 
infrequent case of sports association in the fixed effects estimator, and for a low level of 
significance. This suggests that the impact of sport on trust in society may well be more 
country-specific than general. This is perhaps not surprising as sports often vary across 
countries despite purporting to share common values and they are often identified with 
national  interests  and  well-being  (Downward  et  al  2009,  Kavestsos  and  Szymanki, 
2010).  The  implication  for  policy  is  that  to  the  extent  that  sport  is  identified  with 
national identities then this might suggest challenges for multicultural societies and the 
use of sport to promote multi-national social capital, of which small-scale research has 
already indicated (Bradbury, 2010).  
 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper cross-country evidence is presented to explore the impact of relational 
goods on the formation of trust and, in particular, trustworthiness, which is the degree 
of  trust  placed  in  others.  In  this  way,  the  particular  contribution  of  the  paper  is  to 
examine  how  both  the  type  and  frequency  of  non-contractual  social  interaction  has 
increased  or  reduced  social  capital.  .  Both  informal  activities  such  as  meeting  with 
family and friends, as well as more formal association connected with participation in, 
cultural, political, civic, sports and religious organisations are investigated. The results 
suggest that whilst informal relational activities tend to generally promote feelings of 
trustworthiness, along with cultural and civic association, there is less evidence that 
other forms of association  generally  promote trust.  Sports  association  may be  most 
closely identified with national levels of trust. In addition, the results also suggest that 
religious association may or may not reduce  trust, as with political association. The 
latter results coincide with anecdotal thinking that politics and religion can be both 
socially divisive and cohesive. In this respect, and unlike the existent literature in which 
it is assumed that certain types of association can reduce or increase trust, it is argued 
that it is both the type of voluntary association and its frequency that can be identified 
with the formation of trustworthiness and the development of social capital. Policies 
that look to build growth or national well-being upon increased associational activity 19 
 
thus requires more detailed analysis of the context, rather than the assumption that 
voluntary association has positive social welfare impacts.  20 
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Table 1: Variable description (GESIS, 2009, own calculations). 
Variables  Description  mean (s.d.) 
     
Dependent     
Trust     Degree of trust 
   Ordinal (1=people can always be trusted...4=people can never be 
trusted) 
 
     
Sport / Leisure     
Physical activity  Reference category: never   
   Spdaily     Dummy (1=take part: daily, 0=else)  .149 (.357) 
   Spweek     Dummy (1=take part: several times a week, 0=else)  .253 (.435) 
  Spmonth     Dummy (1=take part: several times a month, 0=else)  .183 (.387) 
   Spyear     Dummy (1=take part: several times a year, 0=else)  .121 (.326) 
Sporting event  Reference category: never   
   Spevdaily     Dummy (1=attend as a spectator: daily, 0=else)  .012 (.111) 
   Spevweek     Dummy (1=attend as a spectator: several times a week, 0=else)  .046 (.210) 
   Spevmonth     Dummy (1=attend as a spectator: several times a month, 0=else)  .122 (.327) 
   Spevyear     Dummy (1=attend as a spectator: several times a year, 0=else)  .280 (.449) 
Sports group  Reference category: never   
   Spgdaily     Dummy (1=participation: at least once a week, 0=else)  .090 (.287) 
   Spgweek     Dummy (1=participation: at least once a month, 0=else)  .056 (.231) 
   Spgmonth     Dummy (1=participation: several times, 0=else)  .068 (.252) 
   Spgyear 
Cultural group 
  Cultgpwe 
  Cultgpmo 
  Cultgpse 
  Cultgpon 
Civic group 
  Civicgow 
  Civicgpm 
  Civicgps 
  Civicgpo 
Political group 
  Polgpwee 
  Polgpmon 
  Polgpsev 
  Polgponc 
Church groups 
  Chchgpwe 
  Chchgpmo 
  Chchgpse 
  Chchgpon 
   Dummy (1=participation: once or twice, 0=else) 
Reference category: never 
Dummy (1=participation: at least once a week, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: at least once a month, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: several times, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: once or twice, 0=else) 
Reference category: never 
Dummy (1=participation: at least once a week, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: at least once a month, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: several times, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: once or twice, 0=else) 
Reference category: never 
Dummy (1=participation: at least once a week, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: at least once a month, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: several times, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: once or twice, 0=else) 
Reference category: never 
Dummy (1=participation: at least once a week, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: at least once a month, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: several times, 0=else) 























  Relatdai 
  Relatwee 
  Relatmon 
  Relatyea 
Friends 
  Friendai 
  Frienwee 
  Frienmon 
  Frienyea 
Reference category: never 
Dummy (1=participation: daily, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: several times a week, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: several times a month, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: several times a year, 0=else) 
Reference category: never 
Dummy (1=participation: daily, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: several times a week, 0=else) 
Dummy (1=participation: several times a month, 0=else) 











Socioeconomic     
   Income     Metric (net income per person)  20,052 (28,475) 
   Age     Metric (age of respondents)  45.89 (17.36) 
   Age2     Metric (age of respondents squared)   
   Sex     Dummy (1=man, 0=else)  .450 (.497) 23 
 
   Hsize     Metric (size of household)  3.210 (1.783) 
   Eduyear     Metric (years of education)  11.867 (3.752) 
Marital status  Reference category: single   
   Couple     Dummy (1=partnership, 0=else)  .551 (.497) 
   Divorced     Dummy (1=divorced, 0=else)  .067 (.250) 
   Separated     Dummy (1=separated, 0=else)  .025 (.155) 
   Widowed     Dummy (1=widowed, 0=else)  .086 (.280) 
Employment status  Reference category: unemployed   
   Ftemp     Dummy (1=full time employment, 0=else)  .454 (.498) 
   Ptemp     Dummy (1=half time employment, 0=else)  .110 (.313) 
   Retired     Dummy (1=retired, 0=else)  .180 (.385) 
   Keephouse     Dummy (1=housewife or man, 0=else)  .088 (.283) 
   Illnotwork     Dummy (1=unemployed through illness, 0=else)  .018 (.132) 






Table 2: Estimation results  
   Ordered Probit model     Random Effects Ordered Probit model 
   Coeffs  t-stats     Coeffs  t-stats  MEs 
Constant  0.00347  0.05     .93951***  10.39    
SEX  0.00120  0.09  0.00012  -0.00341  -0.20  -0.00023 
AGE  -0.00132  -0.53  -0.00013  -0.00137  -0.46  -0.00009 
AGESQ  .60443D-04**  2.39  0.00001  .42771D-04  1.45  0.00000 
HHOLDSIZ  -.03222***  -8.43  -0.00329  -.01619***  -3.67  -0.00111 
COUPLE  -0.01733  -0.94  -0.00177  0.00160  0.07  0.00011 
WIDOW  -.13002***  -4.28  -0.01211  -.07394**  -2.00  -0.00495 
DIVORCED  -.06172**  -2.15  -0.00603  -0.03142  -0.90  -0.00213 
SEPARATE  -0.05602  -1.42  -0.00547  0.03099  0.73  0.00215 
EDUCYEAR  .03424***  18.50  0.00349  .02171***  10.03  0.00149 
FTEMP  0.00765  0.18  0.00078  0.02298  0.49  0.00158 
PTEMP  0.04197  0.95  0.00440  0.02831  0.55  0.00196 
UNEMP  -0.05709  -1.23  -0.00560  -0.02912  -0.56  -0.00198 
EDUC  .17870***  3.13  0.02094  .12604**  2.04  0.00904 
RETIRED  -0.04962  -1.09  -0.00493  0.01374  0.25  0.00095 
KEEPHOUS  -0.05087  -1.13  -0.00502  -0.01451  -0.26  -0.00099 
ILLNOTWO  -0.02305  -0.35  -0.00231  0.10826  1.38  0.00773 
INCOME1  .00479***  19.65  0.00049  .00173***  13.41  0.00012 
RELATDAI  .27345***  7.33  0.03400  -0.02516  -0.66  -0.00171 
RELATWEE  .26968***  8.96  0.03162  .24533***  7.79  0.01783 
RELATMON  .21666***  7.60  0.02320  .18804***  6.48  0.01314 
RELATYEA  .17455***  6.11  0.01878  .18437***  6.51  0.01297 
FRIENDAI  .14582***  4.75  0.01635  .12198***  3.65  0.00867 
FRIENWEE  .26582***  9.95  0.03014  .19487***  6.18  0.01384 
FRIENMON  .29575***  11.38  0.03239  .19642***  6.31  0.01375 
FRIENYEA  .20060***  7.27  0.02274  .15126***  4.38  0.01076 
SPGPWEEK  .15239***  6.75  0.01724  0.03580  1.30  0.00248 
SPGPMONT  .11016***  3.91  0.01218  0.02787  0.85  0.00193 
SPGPSEV  .09346***  3.60  0.01019  0.03555  1.07  0.00247 
SPGPONCE  .09800***  3.89  0.01072  0.03648  0.94  0.00253 
CULTGPWE  .19797***  5.08  0.02353  .82760***  20.55  0.07540 
CULTGPMO  .16498***  5.25  0.01903  .06971*  1.77  0.00490 
CULTGPSE  .14931***  5.87  0.01691  .08693**  2.50  0.00613 
CULTGPON  .16422***  7.39  0.01867  .08313**  2.55  0.00585 
CHCHGPWE  -.12789***  -5.79  -0.01199  .84277***  29.58  0.07422 
CHCHGPMO  -.17423***  -6.62  -0.01567  -.10550***  -3.08  -0.00698 
CHCHGPSE  -.07994***  -3.53  -0.00773  -0.03666  -1.24  -0.00249 
CHCHGPON  -.04330**  -2.02  -0.00429  -0.02476  -0.76  -0.00169 
CIVICGPW  .10221***  2.82  0.01128  .11679***  2.89  0.00835 
CIVICGPM  .12723***  4.29  0.01443  .07106*  1.94  0.00499 
CIVICGPS  .13946***  5.59  0.01567  .14920***  4.91  0.01073 
CIVICGPO  .09307***  4.36  0.01008  .08743***  2.98  0.00615 
POLGPWEE  .14693**  2.06  0.01687  .22966***  3.20  0.01715 
POLGPMON  0.03134  0.65  0.00328  .08227*  1.75  0.00581 
POLGPSEV  -.08466**  -2.32  -0.00809  -.07068*  -1.75  -0.00472 
POLGPONC  0.01891  0.64  0.00196  0.06766  1.55  0.00475 
Mu(1)  1.18717***  154.73     2.18227***  331.76    
Mu(2)  2.61634***  221.33     4.59510***  684.26    
Sigma           1.65859***  147.72    25 
 
Table 2 Continued: Estimation results 
     
 
Fixed Effects Ordered Probit 
model 
 
Ordered Probit Model (+Cluster) 
 
   Coeffs  t-stats  ME  Coeffs  t-stats  ME 
Constant  n.a.  n.a.     0.00347  0.04    
SEX  -0.01483  -0.61  -0.00154  0.00119  0.08  0.00012 
AGE  -0.00258  -0.61  -0.00027  -0.00132  -0.46  -0.00013 
AGESQ  .52638D-04  1.23  0.00001  .60443D-04**  2.08  0.00001 
HHOLDSIZ  -.01879***  -2.81  -0.00195  -.03222***  -5.96  -0.00329 
COUPLE  -0.02001  -0.61  -0.00208  -0.01733  -0.81  -0.00177 
WIDOW  -.09088*  -1.76  -0.00886  -.13003***  -3.79  -0.01211 
DIVORCED  -0.0263  -0.54  -0.00268  -.06173**  -1.97  -0.00603 
SEPARATE  0.05494  0.85  0.00595  -0.05603  -1.2  -0.00547 
EDUCYEAR  .01843***  5.65  0.00191  .03424***  13.55  0.00349 
FTEMP  0.05636  0.81  0.00586  0.00765  0.17  0.00078 
PTEMP  0.05544  0.75  0.00596  0.04197  0.9  0.0044 
UNEMP  -0.00642  -0.08  -0.00066  -0.05709  -1.08  -0.0056 
EDUC  .15542*  1.67  0.01818  .17870***  2.66  0.02094 
RETIRED  0.06114  0.8  0.00656  -0.04962  -0.98  -0.00493 
KEEPHOUS  -0.01271  -0.17  -0.00131  -0.05087  -1.04  -0.00502 
ILLNOTWO  0.13592  1.3  0.01571  -0.02304  -0.3  -0.00231 
INCOME1  .00432***  8.65  0.00045  .00479***  10.68  0.00049 
RELATDAI  0.06905  0.64  0.00754  .27345***  4.82  0.034 
RELATWEE  .21569***  4.47  0.025  .26968***  5.82  0.03162 
RELATMON  .13315***  2.98  0.01423  .21666***  5.36  0.0232 
RELATYEA  .10828**  2.44  0.01161  .17456***  4.42  0.01878 
FRIENDAI  0.08625  0.69  0.00946  .14582***  2.85  0.01635 
FRIENWEE  .21750***  4.65  0.02459  .26582***  6.4  0.03014 
FRIENMON  .19573***  4.29  0.02126  .29575***  7.62  0.03239 
FRIENYEA  .14487***  2.96  0.01622  .20060***  5.43  0.02274 
SPGPWEEK  0.03187  0.82  0.00338  .15239***  5.97  0.01724 
SPGPMONT  0.06118  1.21  0.00664  .11016***  3.45  0.01218 
SPGPSEV  .07695*  1.67  0.00844  .09346***  3.41  0.01019 
SPGPONCE  0.06527  1.39  0.00709  .09800***  3.64  0.01072 
CULTGPWE  .67822***  2.63  0.11477  .19797***  4.16  0.02353 
CULTGPMO  0.08899  1.64  0.00987  .16498***  4.79  0.01903 
CULTGPSE  .13299***  2.89  0.01514  .14931***  5.58  0.01691 
CULTGPON  .12515***  3.06  0.0141  .16423***  7.3  0.01867 
CHCHGPWE  0.23297  0.67  0.02818  -.12789***  -3.14  -0.01199 
CHCHGPMO  -.12946**  -2.57  -0.01225  -.17423***  -5.34  -0.01567 
CHCHGPSE  -0.02652  -0.61  -0.0027  -.07994***  -2.84  -0.00773 
CHCHGPON  -0.02808  -0.66  -0.00286  -.04330*  -1.74  -0.00429 
CIVICGPW  .10111**  1.98  0.01134  .10221***  2.67  0.01128 
CIVICGPM  0.05301  1.08  0.00572  .12723***  4  0.01425 
CIVICGPS  .16264***  3.87  0.01888  .13946***  5.46  0.01567 
CIVICGPO  .09855**  2.54  0.0109  .09307***  4.14  0.01008 
POLGPWEE  .27697***  2.72  0.03577  .14692*  1.67  0.01687 
POLGPMON  0.09286  1.23  0.01037  0.03135  0.56  0.00328 
POLGPSEV  -0.08159  -1.35  -0.00795  -.08466**  -2.03  -0.00809 
POLGPONC  0.0307  0.61  0.00326  0.01891  0.61  0.00196 
MU(1)  1.32425***  73.34     1.18717***  36.64    
MU(2)  2.63778***  104.8      2.61634***      62.77    
 